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Neoplatonism and English Gothic 
Architecture 
 
John Hendrix 
 
 
A letter written by Robert Grosseteste, the first chancellor of Oxford 
University and later Bishop of Lincoln from 1235 to 1253, illustrates 
the role that Neoplatonism played in the creative process of the archi-
tect in the middle ages. The letter was written from Oxford in around 
1200, or closer to 1225, according to Richard William Southern, to 
Master Adam Rufus, a former student. Grosseteste began, “To make 
clear how God is the form of his creatures…the meanings of this word 
‘form’ must be explained.” The Latin forma can be translated as de-
sign, form, mould, pattern, or shape.1 Grosseteste wrote, “It is said that 
the design is the model (or exemplar) to which the craftsman looks to 
make (or formet) his handiwork, in imitation of it and in its likeness.” 
The distinction between the design as exemplar (or archetype) and de-
sign as formed (or formet), is the distinction made in the Renaissance, 
as in the writings of the Accademia di San Luca in Rome, between 
disegno interno, the design in the mind of the artist, as an intelligible, 
and disegno esterno, the visual design which is the result, or as in the 
writings of Leon Battista Alberti, between lineament, the geometry in 
the mind of the architect, and matter, the physical presence of the ma-
terials of the building. At the Accademia di San Luca, the imitation or 
likeness of the disegno interno is the segno di dio in noi, the sign of 
God in us, in the scintilla della divinità, the spark of the divine fire 
which occurs in the mind of the creative artist, as for Grosseteste God 
is the form of his creatures. 
      In the classical world, Vitruvius, in De architectura, called the 
disegno interno the significatum, or that which is signified, while the 
disegno esterno was the significans, that which signifies, as the 
demonstration unfolded in systems of precepts. For Plotinus in the 
Enneads, disegno interno corresponds to the Shaping Principle, or the 
Intellectual Principle, or the Idea, a simple substance in the anima ra-
tionalis, in opposition to matter and the constituents of the anima ra-
tionalis. In the Enneads V.9.3, in the anima rationalis or soul there is 
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something representing matter and something else representing form. 
The form is represented by the Intellectual Principle, as the species 
apprehensibilis or intelligible form of Grosseteste, which corresponds 
both to the shape of the work of art or architecture, and to the artist 
creating the form. Plotinus described how the artist or architect acts as 
the architectus secundus deus, as the work of the artisan is the product 
of the mind of the artisan in the same way that the elements of matter 
take their pattern from the world soul of the cosmos through the Idea, 
which has been received by the soul from the Intellectual Principle, 
both in the cosmos and in the mind of the artisan. The Intellectual 
Principle is both the pattern of the soul and that which gives it its form 
or pattern, in the same way that the form of the work of art exists al-
ready in the mind of the artisan.  
      Grosseteste continued, “Thus the last [or a block shaped like a 
foot], to which the cobbler looks to form the sole accordingly, is 
called the pattern of the sole.” The philosophical basis for the design 
of the architecture is the philosophical basis for the activity of any ar-
tisan, any urban professional of the era, from the most banal to the 
most exalted. “Thus too the lives of good men, which we regard in or-
der to form the manners of our life in their likeness, are called our pat-
tern of living.” Grosseteste likens good design to ethical and moral 
behavior, on the model of the Platonic Good; the philosophical basis 
for all artistic activity is also the philosophical basis for the ethics and 
morality of the era.  
      In his De Libero Arbitrio, Grosseteste compared the light shining 
through the stained glass window of the cathedral to the operation of 
divine grace through free will. In his Epistolae, Grosseteste compared 
his relationship as Bishop to the clergy of the cathedral, and the rela-
tionship between the Pope and his prelates, including Grosseteste, to a 
mirror reflecting light into dark places. The Bishop illuminates the 
minds of the clergy by reflecting the species apprehensibilis, the intel-
ligible form provided by the lux spiritualis, the spiritual light, into the 
oculus mentis, the mind’s eye which perceives the species apprehen-
sibilis, of the clergy, so that the species apprehensibilis can become 
the species sensibilis, the sensible, visual form, as a tangible rule of 
operation, or the model for behavior can become the rule for behavior, 
in the correct operations of the Church, and the Bishop can assert his 
authority. “That is also called a pattern,” according to Grosseteste, “to 
John Hendrix 3 
which material to be shaped is applied and, by its application to it, re-
ceives the imitated shape of that to which it is applied.” 
      Grosseteste continued, “we say of the silver seal that it is the pat-
tern of the wax seal; and of the clay in which the statue is cast, that it 
is the mould of the statue.” The wax seal occurs consistently in the 
commentators on Aristotle as a metaphor for visual perception, in the 
transference from the a priori species apprehensibilis of an object to 
the form of the object as perceived, the species sensibilis, in the same 
way that the pattern of the exemplar is transferred to the craftwork. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his De anima, described sensation, or 
sense perception, as that which “takes place by means of the appre-
hension of the forms of sensible objects without their matter,” which 
“must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of 
wax takes on the impress of a signet ring…” (Alexander’s De anima 
83).2 In his Paraphrase of the De anima, Themistius compared the 
species apprehensibilis to the seal of a wax block on air, the wax 
block being the phantasia, the mechanism of forming images in intel-
lect, “just as though the wax received the imprint of the seal right 
through itself, and after receiving the imprint and being enfolded in it 
had gone on to stamp the same imprint on the air” (92),3 the result be-
ing that “even though the wax and ring had gone away, the surround-
ing air had acquired a structure,” the intelligible structure of the active, 
creative intellect as processed by the agent intellect, through the 
mechanisms of material intellect.  
      Following Alexander and Themistius, Alfarabi, in his Risala, or 
De intellectu,4 used the analogy of the wax seal to describe the differ-
ence between the intelligible and the material, the species apprehensi-
bilis and the species sensibilis. The essence of matter is that element 
of matter in which “form comes to be,” the potential for matter to be 
understood by intellect as form, in the same way that the essence of 
potential intellect is its capacity to understand the form. When a seal is 
stamped on a piece of wax, the seal takes possession of the matter, and 
the matter becomes the form in its totality, as an intelligible or arche-
type. Even the part of the wax which does not take the seal is defined 
in relation to the seal: there can be no species sensibilis without the 
species apprehensibilis, or work of art without the design first in the 
mind of the artisan. The totality is especially complete if the seal on 
the wax transforms the wax in three dimensions, in the form of a cube 
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or sphere, as in architecture. In that case, there can be no distinction 
between the quiddity or essence of the wax in its material existence 
and the quiddity of the form of the wax. Architecture, more than any 
form of expression, reveals the relation between the idea and the ma-
terial presence.  
      Thus for Grosseteste, “when the artist (or artifex) has in his mind 
the likeness of his work of art (or artificii) and regards only that which 
he has in his mind [as in the seal stamped on air], in order to shape his 
art in its likeness, that likeness of the work in the artist’s mind is 
called the design of the work of art (or forma artificii).” Grosseteste’s 
letter exhibits a familiarity with the Enneads of Plotinus. In the Enne-
ads V.8.1, Plotinus compares two blocks of stone, one of which is 
carved into a statue by a craftsman, so that in which “the form is not in 
the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters into the 
stone…”,5 the forma artificii of Grosseteste. In the soul for Plotinus 
there is “something representing Matter [the species sensibilis of 
Grosseteste] and something else representing Form [the species ap-
prehensibilis, the wax seal without the wax], namely, the Intellectual 
Principle within it [or the Aristotelian agent intellect; intelligentia or 
virtus intellectiva of Grosseteste], this corresponding both to the shape 
on the statue and to the artist giving the shape.” (V.9.3). The craft-
work, “the handwrought, with its metal or stone or wood, is not real-
ized out of these materials until the appropriate craft has produced 
statue, house, or bed, by imparting the particular Idea [or intelligible] 
from its own content.”  
      It would be the same for Alberti in the Renaissance: architecture is 
defined by the lineament which is applied to the matter. The building 
is only architecture in the mind of the viewer, as the idea has been 
communicated by the architect, as according to Grosseteste, nor “does 
this sense of design differ much from the sense of pattern first men-
tioned.” The architecture communicates an idea insofar as the linea-
ment in the mind of the viewer corresponds with the idea in the mind 
of the architect, more or less, in a shared matrix of signification 
through language.  
      Grosseteste then uses the analogy of architecture: “So imagine in 
the artist’s mind the design of the work to be made, as in the mind of 
the architect (or architecti) the design and likeness of the house to be 
built; to this pattern and model (or exemplar) he looks only that he 
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may make the house in imitation of it.” The material of the building is 
organized in imitation of the idea in the mind of the architect; like the 
forms of nature in relation to the archetypes of the Platonic demiurge, 
the building is only a shadow or reflection of the architectural idea. In 
the Enneads I.6.3, Plotinus asked, “On what principle does the archi-
tect, when he finds the house standing before him correspondent with 
his inner ideal of a house, pronounce it beautiful?” In the Renaissance, 
Marsilio Ficino compared the architecture of the building to the design 
of forms in nature. In De amore, or the Commentary on the Symposi-
um of Plato, Ficino proposed, “If anyone asked in what way the form 
of the body can be like the Form and Reason of the Soul and Mind, let 
him consider, I ask, the building of the architect” (V.5),6 expressing 
the core idea of Renaissance Humanism, that the human mind corre-
sponds to the workings of nature, an idea which played a role in medi-
eval Scholasticism, but which is untenable in a scientific era. “Who 
will deny,” asks Ficino, “that the house is a body and that it is very 
much like the architect’s incorporeal Idea, in the likeness of which it 
was built?” As for Grosseteste, “In the beginning the architect devel-
ops a Reason or Idea, as it were, of the building in his soul. Then he 
builds, as nearly as possible, the kind of house he has conceived.” 
      In his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Grosseteste de-
fined solertia, a term from the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, as 
translated into Latin by James of Venice, as the penetrating power of 
the oculus mentis, the mind’s eye, which is able to see beyond the sur-
face of an image, such as a form, pattern, or symbol. If the eye sees 
color, for example, the oculus mentis sees the structure of which the 
color is an effect, as described in geometrical terms by Grosseteste in 
his De Iride (or On the Rainbow, or on the Rainbow and the Mirror). 
Solertia, involving dialectical and discursive reasoning, is the ability 
to understand, in perception, the archetypal and intelligible forms that 
define perception itself, and define the process of intellection of the 
perceiving subject. Solertia is the clarity of the vision of the oculus 
mentis of the intelligibles of the intelligentia, the divine intellect, as 
illuminated by the irradiatio spiritualis in the lumen spiritualis, the 
radiated spiritual light, and is thus a faculty of sapientia in the virtus 
intellectiva, the higher part of the anima rationalis, the rational soul. 
      In the letter to Master Adam Rufus, Grosseteste asks the reader to 
“imagine, even though it be impossible, that the will [or solertia] of 
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the same architect wishing to build the house were so powerful that 
this will alone need be applied to shape the material into the house of 
the design in the architect’s mind, so that by this application will be 
fashioned into the house.” The process of architectural design requires 
the penetrating ability and clarity of vision of the oculus mentis in re-
lation to intelligentia, as aided by the irradiatio spiritualis, in the in-
tellectual ascension of the virtus intellectiva. If the process of 
architectural design is successful, then the architecture will accommo-
date the same intellectual ascension in the mind of the viewer. Not on-
ly is the form of the idea in the mind of the architect copied in the 
material of the building, but also the process by which the form is re-
alized.  
      “Imagine also that the material of the house is fluid [the material 
substrate as described by Aristotle], and cannot retain the form it has 
received if it is separated from the design in the architect’s mind,” if 
the matter and the lineament do not coalesce, “as water stamped with a 
silver seal, when the seal is removed, immediately loses the form 
which is received,” as opposed to the seal of the wax block (or phan-
tasia, a product of the solertia of the oculus mentis) on air of Themis-
tius, which is retained as the species apprehensibilis. “So imagine the 
will of the craftsman (or artificis) applying the material of the house to 
the form in the architect’s mind, not only that by this application he 
may fashion it into the house, but also applying the material to the de-
sign that, as long as the house remains in being, the house may be kept 
in being in that form.” The building is a finite, material and perishable 
container for the architecture of it, which is an intelligible idea, not 
subject to the malleability of the material substrate. If the building 
crumbles, the architecture remains, as a wax seal stamped on air. This 
is particularly borne out in the era of mechanical reproduction, where 
the value of the architecture of a building is defined not by the materi-
al presence of the building itself, but by the reproduced images of it.       
      “In such a manner then,” according to Grosseteste, “in which its 
design, in the mind of such an architect, is the design of the house, so 
is art (or ars), or wisdom (or sapientia) or the word of Almighty God 
[or logos] the pattern of all creatures,” the imperishable Platonic ar-
chetype. “For it is at the same time both the model (or exemplar) and 
the producer (or efficiens), and what forms, and what keeps in the 
form given, while creatures are applied to it and removed from it.” As 
John Hendrix 7 
both the intelligible form and the process of design are mimicked in 
the form of the architecture, so are both the form and process of the 
divine intelligentia mimicked in both the nous hylikos or virtus cogita-
tiva, material intellect, and in the forms of nature. There are many in-
stances in Gothic architecture where it is clear that the architectural 
form is intended to function as the logos of the divine. 
      In his cosmologies De Luce (or On Light, 1225–1228) and De 
lineis, angulis et figuris (or On lines, angles and figures, 1228–1233), 
written at Oxford, Robert Grosseteste would describe natural bodies as 
being formed by mathematical and geometrical entities created from 
light, as reflected from the lux spiritualis, the incorporeal, mystical 
light; and in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (1228–1235) 
and the Hexaemeron (c. 1237), Grosseteste would describe the ascen-
sion of the anima rationalis from the material intellect, virtus cogita-
tiva, to the agent intellect, virtus intellectiva, in the apprehension of 
the divine intellect, intelligentia.  
      Plato established that measure and proportion are elements of the 
principle of the Good, which is defined as the beauty of divine intelli-
gence, and which is manifested as “analogously beautiful and pleas-
ant” (Philebus 51)7 through geometrical forms, as in architecture. 
Geometrical figures are absolutely beautiful, “in any situation,” that is, 
“a straight line, a curve and the plane and solid figures that lathes, rul-
ers and squares can make from them,” according to Socrates. In the 
Republic, mathematics is necessary for “all occupations, practical, in-
tellectual, or scientific” (522). For Plotinus in the Enneads, measure 
and proportion communicate the Good of divine intelligence to the an-
ima rationalis through the senses, as in the sensible experience of the 
architecture. In Enneads II.1.7, measure and proportion provide conti-
nuity in the order of the cosmos. In Enneads II.9.16, “What geometri-
cian or arithmetician could fail to take pleasure in the symmetries, 
correspondences, and principles of order observed in visible things?” 
As the matter of the universe is formed in the transference of measure 
and proportion from the divine intelligence, through the instrument of 
the Good of Plato, and the Reason Principle of Plotinus, thus the hu-
man being is capable of forming matter in the arts by transferring that 
aspect of the principles of divine intelligence contained in his or her 
mind to physical form. 
      Thus Plotinus continues, “Consider, even, the case of pictures: 
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those seeing by the bodily sense the products of the art of painting do 
not see the one thing in the one only way,” nor do they in the case of 
architecture: “they are deeply stirred by recognizing in the objects de-
picted to the eyes the presentation of what lies in the idea,” the idea in 
the mind of the artist or architect. In architecture the representation 
occurs in the use of its basic vocabulary elements, mathematics and 
geometry, which, as the lineament of the architecture, are already 
more intelligible, and less tied to the sensible world, than the materials 
used by the painter or architect. 
      According to Plotinus, “In the intellectual, the vision sees not 
through some medium but by and through itself alone,” in the irradia-
tio spiritualis, “for its object is not external” (V.3.8). As the mecha-
nisms of vision are projected onto the sensible world through the 
anima rationalis, in the formation of the species sensibilis through the 
species apprehensibilis, in Grosseteste’s terms, so vision itself is not 
completely dependent on external light, but also on an internal light, 
which is the source of the truest form of seeing in vision for Plotinus: 
“there is an earlier light within itself, a more brilliant, which it sees 
sometimes in a momentary flash….This is sight without the act, but it 
is the truest seeing, for it sees light whereas its other objects were the 
lit not the light” (V.5.7). Such vision is the product of the irradiatio 
spiritualis from the lux spiritualis. The vision of the Intellectual Prin-
ciple of Plotinus depends on its withdrawal from the world of matter, 
so that it “must have its vision—not of some light in some other thing 
but of the light within itself, unmingled, pure, suddenly gleaming be-
fore it.” The pure light gleaming before it is the light of the Good, the 
primeval fire of Anaximander, the being prior to matter, the Platonic 
archê. Thus “It is a principle with us that one who has attained to the 
vision of the Intellectual Beauty and grasped the beauty of the Authen-
tic Intellect will be able also to come to understand the Father and 
Transcendent of that Divine Being” (V.8.1), in the experience of the 
architecture of the Gothic cathedral, and in the intellectual ascension 
that it accommodates toward the virtus intellectiva.  
      The architecture of the Gothic cathedral can be described as hier-
atic, that is, as representing a reality other than sensible reality, as fa-
cilitating ascension to another world, rather than representing the 
physical world. The architecture can be called hieratic in that it repre-
sents the intelligible world of the divine intellect in its intelligible 
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structure, as opposed to the physical world, and it is a projection of the 
internal intelligible structure in the mind of the viewer. As Plotinus 
says in the Enneads, “The faculty of perception in the Soul cannot act 
by the immediate grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discern-
ing of impressions printed upon the Animate [or soul] by sensation: 
these perceptions are already Intelligibles, while the outer sensation is 
a mere phantom of the other (of that in the Soul) which is nearer to 
Authentic-Existence…” (I.1.7). The phantom of the outer sensation is 
the transparency projected by the extramission of light from the eye of 
the impressions printed upon the Animate, the species sensibilis which 
has been formed by the species apprehensibilis in Grossteste’s terms, 
and which appears to discursive reason in material intellect to be an 
immediate perception of the sensible world. The sensible experience 
of the architecture is a product of the intelligible experience of the ar-
chitecture, and the source of the sensible beauty and richness of the 
architecture is its intelligible structure, a product of divine intelligentia 
as it is perceived by the virtus intellectiva, as it is diffused from the lux 
spiritualis through the stained glass window into the refracted and rar-
efacted lumen spritualis into the mathematical and geometrical pro-
portions which define the intelligible and physical structure of the 
architecture.  
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